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11. Three statutory regimes at impasse: 
Reverse payments in pay-for-delay 
settlement agreements between 
brand-name and generic drug . 
companies 
Rudolph J .R. Peritz 
Bayer AG recently paid $398 million to generic competitors in exchange 
for their promise to stay off the market for Ciprofloxacin for the next six 
years. 1 Cipro, as it is called, is a widely used antibiotic. In these agreements 
to settle patent infringement cases, Bayer made reverse payments - so 
called because they were paid by the plaintiff patent holder to the accused 
infringers.2 
There is outrage in the United States over these pay-for-delay agree-
ments. President Obama's proposed budget declares that his 'adminis-
tration will prevent drug companies from blocking generic drugs from 
consumers by prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and collusion 
between brand name and generic drug manufacturers intended to keep 
generic drugs off the market.' 3 The most recent Bill to prohibit such 
settlement agreements has recently been sent to the United States Senate 
from the Judiciary Committee.4 The public outrage and political responses 
1 In re Ciprofioxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 363 F Supp 2d 514 
(EDNY 2005), aff d, 544 F.3d. 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
2 Useful treatments of this subject include CS Hemphill, 'Paying for Delay' 
(2006) 81 NYU L Rev 1553; C Shapiro, 'Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements' 
(2003) 34 RandJ Econ 31; M O'Rourke and JF Brodley, 'An Incentives Approach to 
Patent Settlements' (2003) 87 Minn L Rev 1767; M Carrier, 'Unsettling Drug Patent 
Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality' (2009) 108 Mich L Rev 37. 
3 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fy20 I O_key _healthcare/ (accessed 
November 2009). 
4 Reported in 'Senate Judiciary Committee Approves Bill Banning Reverse 
Payment Agreements' (16 October 2009) Pat Tradem & Copyr J BNA Daily 
Update #198. 
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The decision effectively delayed market entry by generics producers, 
who compete against brand name manufacturers not only on price but 
also in litigation to challenge patent validity and scope. Moreover, FDA 
procedures already required generics producers to go through a lengthy 
and expensive approval process de novo even though their products were 
chemically identical to brand-name drugs that had already been approved. 
Combined with the Federal Circuit decision, the requirement of full FDA 
re-testing effectively delayed competition by generics for years beyond the 
patent period for brand-name drugs. 
At the same time, the lengthy FDA approval process was also affecting 
the branded companies whose research and development produced the 
vast majority of new pharmaceuticals. Indeed, the industry claimed an 
'innovation crisis' starting in the 1970s, when the number of new phar-
maceuticals beginning human testing fell over 80 percent after Congress 
amended the food and drug act to require the showing that drugs were 
not only safe but also effective in their intended uses. The declared crisis in 
pharmaceutical research and development was attributed to the increased 
time needed for FDA approval and, with it, a steep decline in the patent's 
effective life to seven years. 11 
Congress amended the food and drug act by passing the Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984, not only to open bottlenecks in the FDA approval 
process but also to overturn the Federal Circuit decision that prohibited 
unlicensed experimental use of patented drugs in preparation for seeking 
FDA approval. 
The legislation intended a balancing of policies to promote competition 
by innovation by brand-name producers and to promote competition on 
price by generic makers. Experience would show the statute was a flawed 
attempt to promote both forms of competition in the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
Nonetheless, the effort was well-intended. One the one hand, the 1984 leg-
islation addressed the brand name producers' declared 'innovation crisis' by 
extending the drug patent term for as much as five years to take into account 
the lengthy FDA approval process. 12 On average, the period of exclusivity 
for drugs covered by valid patents would increase from 7 to 12 years. 
On the other hand, Congress intended to hasten price competition by 
generics in three important ways. First, Congress overturned the Federal 
11 Cf. Carrier, supra n. 2. 
12 The amendment adds to the patent term half the time taken for clinical trials 
plus the subsequent waiting period for FDA approval, up to a maximum of 14 
additional years. 
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month stays under the Hatch-Waxman Act make little sense in light of an 
FTC study showing that pharmaceutical patent holders have lost almost 
75 percent of patent infringement cases, despite the strong presumption 
that requires accused infringers to prove patent invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence.16 
It is not surprising, then, that drug patent holders pay generics - accused 
infringers - to settle infringement cases that statistics suggest they are 
likely to lose three times out of four. 17 The Hatch-Waxman Act was 
passed on the assumption that generics and consumers have a common 
interest in price competition. But the statute inadvertently changed the 
game. Now branded and generic producers have the common interest: 
the pay-for-delay provisions cost the branded companies far less than the 
profits they would lose from price competition, while generic makers gain 
far more than they would from competing on the market. In effect, it's the 
consumer who pays.18 
In my view, the food and drug act requires further amendment. First, 
when a case is settled, the first filer's 180-day period of exclusivity should 
revert to the next generics filer. Restoring this incentive to file would revive 
the competitive pressure intended by Congress. Second, the automatic 
30-month stay should be eliminated; instead, injunctive relief should 
be available to the drug patent holder only under the same demanding 
principles applied in other patent cases. Third, the reasons claimed for 
patent invalidity or non-infringement in a generic filer's FDA confidential 
application for early market entry should no longer be kept secret. Public 
disclosure would have two likely benefits. First, free information about 
a drug patent's infirmities and limitations would improve the conditions 
for other generics to seek early entry. Second, the size of reverse payments 
would decrease to the extent branded producers are paying for generics' 
agreement to maintain secrecy. 
16 h ttp://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07 /genericdrugstudy. pdf (accessed November 
2009) at p. vi. 
17 The settlement has a bonus for the paying patent holder: the patents remain 
presumptively valid. 
18 To make matters even worse, the Hatch-Waxman Act showed an unin-
tended loophole that permitted the first filing generic to keep the 180-day period 
of exclusivity even after settlement. As a result, all other generics were blocked 
from entering the market until 180 days after the first filer's delayed entry - years 
later, if at all. And so the brand name drug-maker had another valuable reason 
to settle. Congress did pass an amendment in 2003 that narrowed the loop hole 
prospectively. The first filer would now forfeit the exclusivity bonus if it failed to 
market its generic drug within 75 days of FDA approval or of an appellate court 
determination that the patent is invalid or not infringed. 
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It is in this context that federal courts have heard antitrust challenges 
to the reverse payments in agreements settling patent infringement cases. 
Both the Federal Trade Commission and private plaintiffs have filed 
numerous lawsuits claiming that settlements with pay-for-delay provisions 
violate the antitrust laws as agreements in restraint of trade or conspiracies 
to monopolize. 
The first appellate decision, handed down in 2003, concluded that the 
agreement was 'a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.'
19 
The FTC has taken the more moderate position that these agreements are 
presumptively illegal.2° . . 
But all federal appeals courts since 2003 have rejected the views that 
such agreements are per se or presumptively illegal unde~ Sh~r~an Act.§ I 
and its FTC§ 5 equivalent. For example, the Eleventh Clrcmt m reversmg 
the FTC applied a truncated rule of reason to conclude t?at the pa_Y-for-
delay agreement was reasonable and thus legal. The pnmary rat10nale 
given was that when the agreement stays within the scope of the patent, the 
patent holder is merely exercising its statutory right to e~c.lude others ~rom 
making, using, or selling the patented invention. Exerc1sm~ patent n?~ts 
cannot be a violation of the antitrust laws. The court also relied on policies 
in favor of settling lawsuits. 21 . 
In the past few years, these two rationales - patents as exclus10nary 
rights and settlements as deserving deference - have ~een. t~ken up .by the 
2nd Circuit in New York and the powerful Federal Circmt m Washmgton 
to conclude that such agreements are per se legal unless the patent is a sham 
or the infringement case is entirely baseless. This standard has ~ profo~nd 
impact that goes beyond the antitrust injury to con~umers, the h1gh~r pnces 
for pharmaceuticals.22 It spills over into patent pohcy. The courts, m. refus-
ing to consider the reasonableness of the agreement, ha~e .also put .aside ~he 
question of patent viability. The 2nd Circuit stated exphc1tly that its pohcy 
of favoring settlement is so strong that it extends to 'fatally weak' paten.ts, 
'even though such settlements will inevitably pr?tec~ p~t.ent monopohes 
that are, perhaps, undeserved.' This overwhelmmg Judicial deference to 
case settlements, which are, after all, just privat.e contracts, creates t~~ 
perverse incentive to litigate and settle rather than mnovate and compete. 
There are two recent class action suits brought by purchasers of 
19 In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). 
20 See supra n. 15. . 
21 Schering-Plough Corp. v FTC, 402 F.3? 1056 ~I.Ith Ctr. 2006). . 
22 In re Ciprofioxacin Hydrochloride A.n'.tlrust L111g., 544 F.3d .1323 (Fed. Ctr. 
2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust L1t1g., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Ctr. 2006). 
23 In re Tamoxifen litigation, 466 F.3d at 211. 
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Cipro, the subject matter of Bayer's $398 million reverse payment that 
I mentioned to open the chapter. In one, the Supreme Court refused to 
review the Federal Circuit's determination of per se legality24 even though 
54 law, economics, and business scholars filed an amicus brief urging 
the Court to overturn the decision. In the other Cipro class action, the 
2nd Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision approving the settlement 
agreement. Many thought the Court would take a more skeptical atti-
tude toward the agreement and depart from precedent because the Court 
prior to oral argument addressed an extraordinary letter to the Solicitor 
General of the United States inviting 'the Executive Branch to address the 
question.'25 The invitation is highly unusual if not unprecedented in its 
acknowledgement of criticism - here by the Solicitor General that the 2nd 
Circuit's influential opinion in its prior reverse payments case was 'incor-
rect.' An open letter from ten large consumer rights organizations urges 
the government to accept the invitation and confute the view that these 
settlement agreements are legal under the antitrust laws. 26 
The 54 scholars' amicus brief urged the United States Supreme Court 
to reject the view of per se legality, arguing that the public policy in favor 
of settlement does not merit such weight. In_ light of the 73 percent failure 
rate of pharmaceutical patents in cases actually litigated, there is a more 
powerful public interest in invalidating weak patents, stopping unearned 
monopoly profits, and bringing to a halt the perverse incentives produced 
by these reverse payments. 
Indeed, it was five years ago that the Supreme Court affirmed the doc-
trine that patents do not grant antitrust immunity.27 Moreover, there is 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent that IP licensing cannot provide 
a pretext for agreements in restraint of trade.28 The Second and Federal 
24 Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 129 S Ct 2828 
(2009). 
25 Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v Bayer AG, 2d Cir., No. 
05-2851-cv(L), reported in (BNA 1 September 2010) 80 Patent, Tradem & Copyr J 
636. Letter re: In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation to the Office 
of the Solicitor General of the United States from Clerk of the Court, on behalf of 
a three-judge panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
dated 6 April 2009. 
26 Letter re: Need for the Administration's Views in Pharmaceutical 'Exclusion 
Payments' cases written on Behalf of [10 named consumer rights organizations] 
to United States Attorney General Eric H Holder, Jr, US Department of Justice, 
dated 17 April 2009, on file with the author. 
27 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v Independent Ink, Inc., 547 US 28 (2006). 
28 Palmer v BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 US 46 (1990) (finding per se illegal copyright 
licensing agreement as pretext for territorial market allocation). 
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Circuits thus seem to have got it wrong in declaring that every patent 
holder has an absolute right to prevent competition within the 'exclusion-
ary zone' of all patents, including the many that are weak. This approach 
takes the rebuttable status of patent validity and treats it as irrebuttable, 
even though the Supreme Court has long characterized a patent as some-
thing closer to a probable property right. 29 Moreover, it seems pretty clear 
that the generics' promises to delay entry are in consideration for the large 
reverse payments, not in concern for the restraining effects attributable to 
weak patents. 
So, what is the prognosis? If the Supreme Court had granted the peti-
tion in the Federal Circuit's Cipro case to resolve the conflict in the circuit 
courts, the outcome would have been in deep doubt, in my view. Why? 
Because there are two powerful policies that collide, two policies each 
of which the Court has supported independently. For one, there is the 
strong support for property rights, especially intellectual property rights. 
And so the Court is inclined to find as reasonable an agreement whose 
restraints fall within the so-called 'exclusionary zone' of the patent. The 
second policy is procedural rather than substantive. In recent years, the 
Supreme Court has moved away from clear rules and toward balancing 
tests in both antitrust and patent cases. Per se rules have given way to 
more fact-intensive inquiries. In patent cases, for example, the Supreme 
Court has rejected bright line rules fashioned by the Federal Circuit for 
injunctions, prosecution history estoppel, and prior art reference materials 
to determine non-obviousness. 30 In antitrust, the Court's rejection of the 
century-old doctrine that resale price maintenance is per se illegal is only 
the most recent example of a shift toward the rule of reason. 31 
Does this shift make sense? In theory, a rule of reason calls for a flexible 
approach intended to take into account the particular commercial circum-
stances. And that's good. But, in practical terms, a rule of reason analysis 
29 A patent represents a 'legal conclusion by the Patent Office, ... often ex 
parte, ... on factors as to which reasonable men can differ widely. Consequently, it 
does not seem to us to be unfair to require a patentee to defend the Patent Office's 
judgment ... ' Lear, Inc. v Adkins, 395 US 653, 670 (1969). 
30 See, e.g. eBay (more flexible approach to injunctive remedy), supra note. 15; 
KSR Int'!. Co. v Teleflex Inc., 127 S Ct 1727, 1742 (2007) (less rigid approach to 
determining prior art for nonobviousness inquiry; Festa Corp. v Shoketsu Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., Inc., 535 US 722 (2002) (more open approach to determining extent 
of prosecution history estoppel). 
31 See, e.g. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v PSKS, Inc., 551 US 877 
(2007) (applying rule of reason to minimum resale price maintenance); State Oil 
Co. v Khan, 522 US 3 (1997) (applying rule of reason to maximum resale price 
maintenance). 
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in antitrust amounts to de facto legality because it produces high cost and 
high risk cases, which deters litigation. This closing of the court house 
door in my view is inconsistent with the longstanding US policy favoring 
and, indeed, depending on private plaintiffs, often small firms and con-
sumers unable to afford the expensive litigation of rule of reason cases; 
moreover, the standards for class action suits have become exceedingly 
difficult to attain. And so I am disinclined from a full-blown rule of reason. 
The best solution in the antitrust cases, in my view, would be adoption 
of the FTC's approach of presumptive illegality, which would shift some 
cost and risk to the brand-name manufacturer and, as a result, improve 
conditions for generics to challenge weak patents and compete on price. 
Moreover, the approach would mitigate the perverse incentives that result 
from shielding weak patents from scrutiny. Indeed, a strong presumption 
of illegality would reflect judicial experience, in particular the 73 percent 
failure rate in cases litigated to date. Finally, the FTC would become an 
even more forceful arbiter of these settlement agreements. 
Together with amendments to fix the food and drug act, what would 
be the result of an antitrust analysis that begins with a strong presump-
tion that reverse payments in pay-for-delay settlements are illegal? The 
market for pharmaceuticals would sooner become price competitive, weak 
drug patents would be more open to challenge, and as a result consum-
ers would save billions of dollars annually without taking from branded 
drug companies legitimately earned incentives to engage in research and 
development. 
12. Patent ambush and reverse 
payments: Comments 
Gustavo Ghidini 
My comments are very short and address both topics jointly. I believe 
that, in the case of both reverse payment and patent ambush, antitrust 
enforcement should not take into consideration, as arguments for defence, 
the questions of validity and/or scope of the patent concerned, or the 
degree of market power it may embody or has come to embody. 
In either case, indeed, on the one hand, the competitor's behaviour is 
not based, in a proper sense, on the exercise of her/his statutory patent 
rights (see below). On the other hand, symmetrically, the rationale of 
antitrust enforcement rests on different and independent legal grounds, not 
essentially influenced by 'strictly IP' questions. Of course, patents come 
into play, but in relation to the factual, rather than the legal, framework. 
Take, for example, the issue of reverse payments: what has this practice 
to do, in a proper sense, with the exploitation of patent rights? Patent 
rights allow the exclusion of free riders, and not of lawful entries. In 
other words, contractual exclusion is not a legal exercise of patent rights. 
Therefore, a pay-for-delay settlement is just a straightj(nward horizontal 
agreement in restraint of competition, which would be equally illicit - this 
is a counterproof of my assumption - even if no patent existed. Wouldn't 
pay-for-delay settlements violate antitrust rules even if they took place 
between two producers of generics? As Abbott and Michel of the FTC 
have convincingly argued in 2006, 1 'the payment and not the patent 
provides exclusion resulting from the agreement'. 
Analogously in patent ambush cases: here, thanks to his fraudulent 
1 AF Abbot and ST Michel, 'The right balance of competition policy and 
intellectual property law: a perspective on settlement of pharmaceutical patent liti-
gation' (2005) 46 IDEA 1, also available at: http://nessiteras.piercelaw.edu/assets/ 
pdf/idea-vol46-nol-abbott-michel.pdf (accessed December 2010). Mr Abbott 
was Associate Director, and Ms Michel Chief Counsel at the Federal Trade 
Commission. See also In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 US 939 (2004). 
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